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Abstract— Future Internet of Things (IoT) will connect to the 
Internet billions of heterogeneous smart devices with the capacity 
of interacting with the environment. Therefore, the proposed 
solutions from an IoT networking perspective must take into 
account the scalability of IoT nodes as well as the operational cost 
of deploying the networking infrastructure. This will generate a 
huge volume of data, which poses a tremendous challenge both 
from the transport, and processing of information point of view. 
Moreover, security issues appear, due to the fact that untrusted 
IoT devices are interconnected towards the aggregation 
networks. 
In this paper, we propose the usage of a Software-Defined 
Networking (SDN) framework for introducing security in IoT 
gateways. An experimental validation of the framework is 
proposed, resulting in the enforcement of network security at the 
network edge. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Billions of objects will be connected to the internet in the 
coming years. Therefore, it is expected a real revolution on the 
amount of data gathered and shared. This is known as the 
Internet of Things (IoT). Everyday objects, such as home 
appliances, lampposts, traffic lights or irrigation outlets, are 
some examples of smart things. They are equipped with several 
sensors generating data, which then should be gathered and 
analyzed. 
Cloud computing refers to the ability to store and access 
data and programs over the Internet. It is a service offered by 
centralized large scale data centers, which might be 
geographically distributed. Instead, fog computing is a new 
paradigm for a decentralized and distributed computing 
infrastructure in which application services are handled at the 
network edge. Its goal is to improve efficiency and reduce the 
amount of data that needs to be transported to the cloud for 
data processing, analysis and storage [1]. 
The integration of IoT with fog and cloud computing is a 
valuable solution due to the functionality of computing, storage 
and networking resources at the edge of the network, thus 
allowing fast interaction with the data and low latency. Fog and 
cloud computing are expected to allow the data storage and 
processing from billions of smart things and IoT gateways. IoT 
gateways are key enablers for IoT and typically consists of 
small gateways which are able to interconnect distributed 
wireless sensors, interconnected through wireless sensor 
networks (WSN), and acting as an internet gateway for the 
interconnected devices. 
Software Defined Networking (SDN) [2] is expected to be 
a key enabler for the next generation networks, the so-called 
5G (5th generation of wireless systems), which will need to 
integrate both IoT services together with traditional human-
based services. In this context, SDN enables a global 
orchestration of distributed cloud, heterogeneous network and 
IoT resources required in order to: a) Transport the huge 
amount of data generated at the terminals, sensors, machines, 
nodes, etc., to any distributed computing node, edge, or core 
data center; b) Allocate computing, storage and network 
resources, and; c) Process the collected data (Big Data) and 
make the proper decisions (cognition). 
One of the biggest challenges which presents IoT to 
network administrators, is the ability to collect data and 
conduct analysis to produce a positive user experience on the 
go. SDN is able to redirect traffic automatically when needed, 
which significantly improves the IoT applications. Through 
orchestration virtual network, storage and computing resources 
are provisioned and instantly delivered for the analysis of data.  
However, due to the fact that untrusted IoT devices might 
be interconnected towards the aggregation networks or external 
malware could be applied to the network [3] security issues 
may arise. It is in this context, SDN can offer a plethora of 
solutions to enhance security. 
The technical solution proposed in this paper provides an 
agile answer on how to overcome these problems and improve 
the IoT security within software-defined networks. The 
proposed work consists in the design and validation of an 
SDN-enabled security framework in an experimental platform 
(network environment). Moreover, we have designed, 
evaluated experimentally validate an intrusion detection 
algorithm as an SDN application. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, an 
introduction on the State of the Art on IoT, SDN and Security 
is provided. Section III proposes an SDN-enabled security 
architecture, which leverages the available real-time network 
flows information in order to take decisions regarding the 
provided security at the edge. An intrusion detection algorithm 
is proposed to validate the architecture design and it is 
evaluated in Section IV, in a simulated environment. In Section 
V, the experimental evaluation and results are provided for the 
proposed security architecture. Finally, Section VI presents the 
conclusions. 
II. STATE OF THE ART 
A. Internet of Things 
The International Telecommunications Union defines the 
Internet of Things (IoT) as the “global infrastructure for the 
information society, enabling advanced services by 
interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing 
and evolving interoperable information and communication 
technologies” [4].  
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a computer network 
composed by autonomous devices that uses sensors to monitor 
environmental or physical conditions such as vibration, 
temperature, sound, pressure or motion at different locations. 
Wireless sensor networks are now used in many application 
areas (e.g., smart cities, eHealth, Industry 4.0) [5]. The WSN is 
built of nodes, where each node is connected to one (or 
sometimes) several sensors, which provide the data for IoT 
applications. The topology of the WSNs can vary from a 
simple star network to an advanced multi-hop wireless mesh 
network.  
Gateways are simplifying the IoT networks by supporting 
the connection of different network devices and by 
consolidating and mitigating the great variety and diversity of 
disparate data coming from different network devices. A 
simple IoT gateway organizes and packetizes the data for 
transport over the Internet. It is also responsible for distributing 
data back to end points in applications where two-way 
communications are advantageous or required. 
B. Software-Defined Networking 
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is a network 
architecture that allows the programming of the network 
through clearly defined interfaces. SDN allows the possibility 
of creating new services and more efficient applications based 
on the interaction with networks traffic, network security 
implementation, or quality of service. 
Given the heterogeneity of networks, it is challenging to 
coordinate and optimize the use of the heterogeneous network 
resources with the goal of satisfying as many tasks and services 
as possible. It is conjecture that the SDN paradigm is a good 
candidate to solve the resource management needs for network 
environments for multiple reasons [2]: 
 SDN allows for a clear separation between services in the 
control plane (that makes decisions about how traffic is 
managed) and the data plane (actual mechanisms for 
forwarding traffic to desired destinations). The decoupling 
of the control plane from the forwarding plane encourages 
abstractions of low level network functionalities.  
 Logically centralized view of the network, which allows to 
perform network optimization techniques. Redundancy 
and other mitigation failures can be applied in order to 
avoid single points of failure. 
 Network programmability allows the dynamic and fast 
introduction of new network services. 
The OpenFlow protocol is an open source protocol that is a 
foundational element for building SDN solutions. This protocol 
allows network controllers to determine the flow paths across a 
network of switches thus enabling the easy traffic management 
through the separation of the control plane from the forwarding 
plane. 
An OpenFlow Switch consists of one or more flow tables 
and a group table, which perform packet lookups and 
forwarding, and an OpenFlow channel to an external controller. 
The SDN controller manages the switch via the OpenFlow 
protocol. Using this protocol, the controller can add, update, 
and delete flow entries, both reactively (in response to packets) 
and proactively [2] 
The SDN controller is a software entity that has exclusive 
control over an abstract set of data plane resources. Several 
open source implementations of an SDN controller are 
available. Applications can run on top of SDN controller in 
order to offer advanced network services. SDN-enabled 
security applications are starting to emerge as we discuss in the 
next subsection. 
C. Security framework 
Prior to the emergence of IoT, the adverse effects of threats 
were limited to theft of money and intellectual properties. Now, 
the effect can lead to loss of human life, hacking of critical 
infrastructures like electricity and nuclear power grids, 
organizational productivity, and even national intelligence, so 
security becomes of the essence. The solutions such as 
intrusion detection and prevention systems, encryption, and 
access management are the major solutions securing IoT. Many 
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) have been 
developed by researchers and practitioners [6][7][8][9]. 
D. Anomaly Detection Solutions 
The authors in [10] provide a classification of network 
anomaly methods. Several approaches are discussed: a) 
Statistical methods and systems, b) Classification-based 
methods and systems, c) Clustering and Outlier-based methods 
and systems, d) Soft computing methods and systems, e) 
Knowledge-based methods and systems. 
Focusing on statistical methods, an anomaly (from the 
statistical perspective) behavior is being considered partially or 
entirely inappropriate due to the fact that is not generated by 
the assumed stochastic model. Statistical methods usually fit a 
model to the given data and then apply a statistical inference 
test to determine if an unseen instance belongs to this model. 
Instances that have a low probability to be generated from the 
learnt model, based on the applied test statistic, are declared 
anomalies.  
E. Anomaly mitigation strategies 
Two are the most important mitigation strategies. The first 
focuses on limiting the effect of an anomaly to the network 
bandwidth, while the second tries to completely minimize the 
impact of an anomaly, and it can be understood as a corner 
case of the first strategy.  
1) Rate Limiting 
In computer networks, rate limiting is used to control the 
rate of traffic sent or received by a network interface controller. 
It can be induced by the network protocol stack of the sender 
and also by the network scheduler of any router along the way. 
The rate limiting (or traffic shaping) is the regulation of the rate 
at which flows are allowed to inject packets into the network 
and is therefore one of the cornerstones of any QoS 
architecture. OpenFlow 1.3 allows different rate limiting 
policies once a certain rate has been reached: a) Drop, (discard) 
the packet, which can be used to define a rate limiter band; b) 
Dscp, which decreases the drop precedence of the DSCP field 
in the IP header of the packet. Can be used to define a simple 
DiffServ police. 
2) Flow interruption  
In order to do not allow any traffic of a suspicious flow, the 
flow rule can be directly removed from the SDN controller, 
which can be considered a particular case of the previous 
technique. 
III. SDN-ENABLED SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
Our proposed IoT security architecture consists of three 
main blocks, which are show in Fig. 1: an SDN/NFV edge 
node, an SDN controller and an E2E security Application. 
The SDN/NFV Edge Node is a distributed computing 
infrastructure (or fog computing) in which some services are 
handled at the network edge. The goal of this fog node is to 
improve efficiency and reduce the amount of data that needs to 
be transported to the cloud for data processing, analysis and 
storage. This is often done for improving the efficiency of the 
network, but it may also be implemented for security and 
compliance reasons. This Fog node has the ability to act as:  
a) An OpenFlow-enabled switch in order to switch the 
different IoT gateways that are connected. Moreover 
connectivity to aggregation and transport networks is also 
provided. 
b) Virtual Machines running different services, such as an IoT 
database, where the measurements of the different sensors 
are stored for local processing. 
The SDN controller shall be able to support OpenFlow 
control of flow tables, meters and actions. A clear North Bound 
Interface (NBI) of the SDN controller shall be described in 
order to ease the integration of higher level applications.  
The End-to-end security Application will be responsible for 
monitoring of the current flows, and through different anomaly 
detection mechanism it will be able to identify malicious flows. 
Finally, this application will apply the desired security policies 
with regard to the detected anomalies in order to mitigate them. 
It consists of three main modules shown in Fig. 1: (a) the 
Collector, (b) the Anomaly Detection and (c) the Anomaly 
Mitigation.  
 
Fig. 1. SDN-enabled Security Framework 
A. Collector 
The Collector module is responsible for gathering the data, 
a prerequisite in order to perform flow-based anomaly 
detection. This module collects flow information and 
periodically report them to the Anomaly Detection module. If 
we focus on the available information from the SDN controller, 
the different per flow counters are obtained. From this 
information we can estimate the Packets per second per flow; 
and the bytes per second per flow. Anomalies in the flows, 
such as for example intrusion detection, or malfunctions are 
detected from the the statistics from the gathered data. 
B. Anomaly Detection Module 
The data generated by the previous module are 
subsequently fed to the Anomaly Detection module at periodic 
time intervals, thus creating discrete time windows. For every 
time window this module inspects all the flow entries, exposing 
any flow-related network anomaly and identifying a potential 
attacker or the victim of the attack. Moreover, it performs 
successfully not only in identifying the attack pattern (e.g., 
flood), but also the victim (i.e., host under attack). Once an 
anomaly is detected in the network, the proposed algorithm 
inspects and correlates specific network metrics by identifying 
the attack and exposing all related information to the Anomaly 
Mitigation module. 
In particular, in the context of abuse and network intrusion 
detection, the interesting objects are often unexpected bursts in 
activity. This pattern does not adhere to the common statistical 
definition of an outlier as a rare object, and many outlier 
detection methods (in particular unsupervised methods) will 
fail on such data, unless it has been aggregated appropriately.  
The most common measures of dispersion for continuous 
data are the variance and standard deviation. Both of them 
describe how much the individual values in a data set vary 
from the mean or average value. The variance and standard 
deviation are calculated slightly differently depending on 
whether a population or a sample is being studied, but basically 
the variance is the average of the squared deviation from the 
mean, and the standard deviation is the square root of the 
variance.  
For the detection of the anomalies it has been envisaged an 
algorithm based on the data variance gathered from any sensor 
device in the network. The formula presented below is the 
deviation calculated for the n data samples (xi) provided and its mean by the sensors 
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The malware detection for the data processed by the sensors 
and is conditioned by the following formula, where n is a 
configurable parameter: 
  nxxi   (2) 
C. Anomaly Mitigation Module 
The Anomaly Mitigation module aims to neutralize 
identified attacks, by inserting flow meters in the flow table of 
the Open Flow switch (or removing existing flows) in order to 
block/mitigate the desired malicious traffic. These flow entries 
have higher priority than any other in the flow table. 
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS 
The IoT security algorithm has been developed by using 
Python programming language. A conformant flow is created 
with the following properties: a) Using the base of 20 
packets/second, which shall match for example the readings of 
20 sensors each second, we introduce a small uniform variance; 
and b) The number of bytes per second is linearly obtained 
from the packets per second (using a standard 100 bytes per 
packet). Instead, a bad flow is created with a probability of 
10%. A bad flow has different properties: a) The number of 
packets per second are duplicated (in comparison with a 
conformant flow); and b) The packet size is also 50% 
increased. 
 
Fig. 2. Simulation results for error rate in anomaly detection (%) depending 
on window size 
It is important to mention that the simulations were carried 
out for 5 simulated parameters N_SIGMA (n) and 3 simulated 
parameters of WINDOW for both types of the simulated 
traffic, packets/s and bytes/s. Firstly we selected an optimal 
N_SIGMA of 10, after several N_SIGMA variations. We 
computed the error rate of the algorithm, including both false 
positive and negative results. 
The simulations were carried out for N_SIGMA= 10 and 
1000 samples. For each WINDOW length the algorithm was 
simulated 3 times and each time the error was tracked, 
afterwards it has been calculated the mean value of Error (%). 
As a first approach it is observed that when incrementing the 
window of simulation from 5 to 10 the error is decreased (see 
Fig. 2). This is due to the fact that a small window size, doesn’t 
leave time to properly measure the flow standard deviation. 
Decisions made by this incorrect measurement of standard 
deviation will be error prone. If we increment the window 
length from 10 to 20, the error rate in anomaly detection is 
incremented. The optimal window size result is an error rate in 
anomaly detection of 3,9%. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION 
In order to carry out the experimental part of this work two 
official platforms developed by the CTTC´s research staff has 
been interconnected, the IoTWorld® Testbed and the 
ADRENALINE Testbed® (Fig 3). The ADRENALINE 
cloud/fog computing platform and transport network offer an 
integrated cloud and network orchestration which is capable of 
creating VMs and establishing End-to-End (E2E) paths through 
heterogeneous networks considering multi-domain SDN 
orchestration. The deployed architecture allows providing E2E 
connectivity services of VMs located in different network 
locations, interconnected though multi-layer multi-domain 
networks considering heterogeneous SDN/OpenFlow (OF) and 
General Multiprotocol Label Switches (MPLS)/Path 
Computation Element control planes [11]. 
 
Fig. 3. Overall ADRENALINE & IoTWORLD Testbed 
The IoTWORLD®, is an End-to-End platform for the 
Internet of Things. The main focus is on Wireless 
Communications systems and data analytics. The platform has 
been deployed in two different neighbour buildings: in a 
laboratory, in an isolated room, and in a real office 
environment. Different sensors and actuators are connected to a 
set of gateways, either with a direct connection or via multiple 
hops. These gateways are then connected to the Internet, 
providing the capability to retrieve and store data in the cloud, 
among other functionalities, such as data fusion, compression 
and analytics.  
For the sake of the experiments the IoT platform consists of 
a temperature and a dioxide carbon (CO2) sensors, 2 Wireless 
(802.15.4 compliance) nodes and 2 gateways that gather the 
data generated by the sensors, one SDN NFV Edge Node to 
control the flows of data coming from the sensors and a 
database where the data is stored. The SDN NFV Edge Node 
network element is able to provide computing, storage and 
networking services, acting as a cloud edge node (fog node) 
and has been introduced in [12]. 
Fig. 3 presents the considered system architecture which 
includes the proposed SDN/NFV-enabled edge node. The 
proposed node consists of an OF-enabled switch, compute and 
storage resources. The switch is controlled via an edge SDN 
controller, while the computation and storage resources are 
controlled with an edge cloud/fog controller. On top of the 
proposed architecture, the Integrated Cloud/Fog and Network 
Orchestrator is responsible for handling a VM and network 
connectivity requests, which are processed through the 
Cloud/Fog and Multi-domain SDN orchestrators.  
We have extended OpenStack Mitaka in order to provide 
control for distributed availability zones, we refer as Cloud 
Orchestrator. For Multi-domain SDN Orchestrator we have 
developed an Application-Based Network Operations 
architecture, which has been previously demonstrated in [11]. 
It allows the provisioning of E2E connectivity services through 
different underlying SDN-controlled network domains. In this 
paper, we focus on describing the access network of the 
testbed, which is controlled by with the Integrated Cloud and 
Network Orchestrator, which is able to deploy applications and 
services on top of the testbed infrastructure. 
The proposed E2E security application runs on top of the 
SDN/NFV-enabled edge node (see Fig. 1). The proposed 
SDN/NFV edge node has been developed using an Intel NUC 
NUC5i5RYH, with 16Gb RAM and 120 Gb SSD. Several 
USB to Ethernet port converters have been included in order to 
extent the node switching capabilities.  
The wireless nodes are Z1 motes by Zolertia, which feature 
a 16-bit RISC CPU @16MHz, an 8KB RAM and a 92 KB 
flash memory. They also include the CC2420 transceiver, 
which is IEEE 802.15.4 compliant. These nodes support 
ContikiOS, an open-source operating system for the IoT, which 
connects tiny, low-cost, low-power microcontrollers to the 
Internet and supports Ipv6 through 6LowPAN. It is worth 
noting that each mote can operate as either a source or a sink 
node. Finally, the IoT gateways are connected to 2 sink nodes 
via USB. IoT gateways have been implemented using a 
Raspberry Pi 2, using Raspbian, based on Debian. The IoT 
gateway reads the measurements in the USB port and it 
retransmits them to a processing software, which is run in a 
VM running at the edge node.  
In Fig. 4, the overall system from the networking 
perspective is depicted. First, two IoT gateways are 
interconnected towards a virtual software switch (SW1), 
running on the edge node. This external virtual software switch 
is interconnected towards an internal virtual software switch 
(SW2) into with the virtual machines are connected. Finally, 
the IoT virtual machine (test_iot) is connected to this second 
switch. 
The traffic is routed from IoT Gateway 1 with MAC 
address b8:27:eb:4f:67:5b and IP address 10.1.14.7 through the 
source: OpenFlow switch with the following MAC address 
00:00:80:3f:5d:08:2b:72 and interface connected to port 1, with 
the following IP address 10.1.7.48 and the destination: a switch 
with the following MAC address 00:00:6a:5a:fb:3b:66:41, this 
switch is in charge of managing the traffic of the IoT SQL 
Database through an interface of the controller, number 41, 
with the following IP address 192.168.30.30.  
 
Fig. 4. Overall system configuration 
The traffic is routed from Gateway 2 with MAC address 
b8:27:eb:8a:c5:ff and IP address 10.1.14.8 through the source, 
OpenFlow switch with the following MAC address 
00:00:80:3f:5d:08:2b:72 and interface connected to port 3, with 
the following IP address 10.1.7.49 and the destination: a switch 
with the following MAC address 00:00:6a:5a:fb:3b:66:41 , this 
switch is in charged to manage the traffic of the IoT SQL Data 
Base through an interface of the controller, number 41, with the 
following IP address 192.168.30.30.  
The Collector module is responsible for data gathering, a 
prerequisite in order to perform flow-based anomaly detection. 
This module collects flow information and periodically exports 
them to the Anomaly Detection module. The flows are 
recorded as per packets per second and bytes per second as 
presented in the traffic frame presented below. 
The data produced by the Data Collector are subsequently 
fed to the Anomaly Detection module at fixed time intervals, 
thus creating discrete time windows. For every time-window 
this module inspects all flow entries, exposing any flow-related 
network anomaly and identifying a potential attacker or the 
victim of the attack. Moreover, it performs successfully not 
only in identifying the attack pattern, but also the attacker or 
the victim (i.e. host under attack). As soon as an anomaly is 
detected in the network, our algorithm inspects and correlates 
specific network metrics in order to identify the attack and 
forward all related information to the Anomaly Mitigation 
module. The used algorithms are the previously presented in 
Section III. 
The Anomaly Mitigation module aims to neutralize 
identified attacks, inserting flow-entries in the flow table of the 
Open Flow switch (or modify existing ones) in order to block 
the desired malicious traffic.  
A widely used and easy to be implemented method for the flow 
mitigation is the flow limiting (rate limit) in the OF Switch. In 
this demonstration, the flow interruption mechanism has been 
used. Fig. 5 shows the message exchange using a Wireshark 
capture. It can be seen the flow traffic eliminated from the 
switch OF_1, IP address 10.1.7.45. 
 
Fig. 5. Wireshak: Flow limiting in the OF Switch  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
We have demonstrated the feasibility to use an SDN-
enabled security framework and we have proposed a security 
architecture for IoT devices, which is based on the principles of 
SDN. A simple algorithm has been implemented to analyze the 
feasibility of statistical analysis for anomaly detection. We 
have introduced the proposed SDN security application for IoT 
by interconnecting the ADRENALINE and IOTWORLD 
testbeds, running on top of an SDN/NFV-enabled edge node. 
Finally, we have demonstrated the flow interruption anomaly 
mitigation technique.  
Further research on security for IoT needs to be performed, 
but using the powerful framework on SDN, has been 
demonstrated as a useful weapon against security threads. 
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